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United States, 255 U. S. 298, 41 S. Ct. 261, 65 L. Ed. 647 (1921). It is
interesting to note in reading these eases that after saying the constitutional provision should be -liberally construed, the first case drew
a distinction between the search of a man's private papers for the
purpose of convicting -him of a crime and a search for contraband
gods "which rightfully belongs to the custody of the law." The second
-ase added that the 4th Amendment permits search and seizure when
justified by the interest of the public and when the lawful exercise
,of police power renders possession of the goods sought unlawful and
provides for their seizure.
In defense of the decision, which unquestionably resulted in the
defendant escaping the penalty for breaking the law, it might be argued
that the responsibility lies with Congress and not with the court. In
the section of the National Prohibition Act above quoted, Congress
provided that the search of a -rivate dwelling might be made only
wvhere it was used for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor. If they
had intended manufacture and sale they should have so stated. The
:Florida Statute which is otherwise similar to the federal act did insert
the word manufacture. Compiled Laws of Florida 1927, Section 8518.
The writer, however, -prefers the view taken by the court in United
States v. Berger, 22 F (2d) 867 (1927), that a dwelling that is used
for the unlawful manufacture of liquor which is either sold there or is
removed from thence for sale, is subject to search. Here the statute
was interpreted to give the expression, "for the sale," a meaning equivalent to "in connection with the sale," under authority of Title 2,
Section 3 of the National Prohibition Act (27 U. S. C. A., see. 12),
which provides that "all the provisions of this shall be liberally construed to the end that the use of intoxicating liquor as a beverage may
be prevented."
There must necessarily be a lack of uniformity in decisions which
must rest on "what a reasonably discrete and prudent man" 'would
think. Many border line cases will depend on the attitude of the judge
or judicial officer. Just how much weight will be given to general suspicion, hearsay, reputation of the defendant and judicial notice .of the
character of the neighborhood where the property to be searched 'is
located, will vary with the judge for "judges are human."
1). L. THORNTOn.
the recent case of
AGLENcy-THu F.AmiLr PuwosE DoornR i--In
Steele v. Age's Admr, 223 Ry. 714, 26 S. W 2d) 563 (1930), a minor
son, driving with his lathir's consent, had a collision in the family
automobile. The boy was driving recklessly at the time, and the
iac'hine was precipitated onto tfle sidewalk, where it struck and
killed the -plaintiff's intestate. The father, who maintained the automobile for the general use and convenience of the family, 'Was held
liable. The court based its decision on 'the "family purpose doctrine,"
147 'Ky. 386,
which has been adoptea in Kentucky. ,Stowe v. Mrs,
144S. W '52 (1912); Willerv. Wect, 1'6 Ky. 552, '21q S. W ;904 1920),
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Thsxton v. Palmer, 210 Ky.. 839, 276 S. W. 971 (1925), Kennedy v.
Wolf, 221 Ky. 111, 298 S. W 188 (1927).
The "family purpose doctrine" is based on the relationship of
principal and agent and the rule of agency, qu facit per alium, facit
per se. The theory is that one who maintains an automobile for the
use or pleasure of the family has made it his business to furnish
pleasure for the family. It follows that when the owner's child is
using the family automobile for his own pleasure and convenience he
is furthering the "business" of the owner, and is deemed to be the
agent of the owner. Dams v. Littlefield, 97 S. C. 171, 81 S. E. 487
(1914), Stickney v. Epstein, 100 Conn. 170, 123 AUt. 1 (1923), Grtffin
v. Russell, 144 Ga. 275, 87 S. E. 10 (1915).
Before examining the authorities on the doctrine we might consider the Kentucky court's basis for its adoption, which basis is novel,
to say the least. Stowe v. Morris, 147 Ky. 386, 144 S. W 52 (1912),
is the first Kentucky case on the question. It is based on the early
case of Lashbrook v. Patten, 1 Duv. 317 (1864). In that case a minor
son of the defendant negligently caused an injury to the plaintiff while
driving his sister to a picnic. He was driving the family carriage
with the consent of his father. The father was held liable on the
ground that the son was performing a service usually performed by
a slave, and hence must be deemed the servant of his father.
Other jurisdictions which are in accord with Kentucky in holding
that a member of the family, driving the "family purpose automobile,"
is the agent of the owner are, Ariz., Benton v. Regeser, 20 Ariz. 273,
179 Pac. 966 (1919), Conn., Rtickney v. Epstein, 100 Conn. 170, 123
Atl. 1 (1923), Colo., Hutchins v. Haffner, 63 Colo. 365, 167 Pac. 966
(1917), Ga., Griffin v. Russell, 144 Ga. 275, 87 S. E. 10 (1915), Iowa,
Collinson v. Cutter, 186 Iowa 276, 170 N. W 421 (1919), Minn., Keyser
v. Van Nest, 125 Minn. 277, 146 N. W 1091 (1921), Neb., Lrinch v.
Dobson, 108 Neb. 632, 188 N. W 227 (1922), N. C., Tyree v. Tudor,
181 N. C. 214, 106 S. E. 675 (1921), Ore., Foster v. Farra,117 Ore. 286,
243 Pac. 778 (1926), S. C., Davs v. Littlefield, 97 S. C. 171, 81 S. E.
487 (1914), Tenn., King v. Smythe, 140 Tenn. 217, 204 S. W 296 (1918),
Texas, Way v. Guest, 272 S. W. 217 (1922), Wash., Burch v. Abercrombie, 74 Wash. 486, 133 Pac. 1020 (1913), W. Va., Aggleson v.
Kendall, 92 W Va. 138, 114 S. E. 454 (1922).
The weight of authority is opposed to this view and represents
what appears to be the better rule. The majority rule is that where a
member of the family uses such a vehicle for his own purposes, the
machine is not being used within the scope of the owner's business
and he is not liable for the driver's negligent operation of it. Ala.,
Parkerv. Wilson, 60 So. 150, 179 Ala. 361 (1912), Ark., Norton v. Hall,
149 Ark. 428, 232 S. W 934 (1921), Cal., Spence v. Fisher, 184 Cal.
209, 193 Pac. 255 (1920), Ill., Aiken v. Page, 287 Ill. 420, 123 N. E.
30 (1919), Kan., Watkin v. Clark, 103 Kan. 629, 176 Pac. 131 (1918),
Me., Farnum v. Clifford, 118 Me. 145, 106 AtI. 344 (1919), Md., Whitlock v. Dennis, 139 Md. 557, 117 Atl. 68 (1921), Mich., Loehr v. Abell,
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174 Mich. 590, 140 N. W 926 (1913), Mass., Weiner v. Mazrs, 234 Mass.
156, 125 N. E. 149 (1919), Miss., Woods v. Clements, 113 Miss, '720,
74 So. 422 (1917), Mo., Hays v. Hogan, 273 Mo. 1, 200 S. W 286 (1917),
Ohio, Elms v. Flick, 100 Ohio 186, 126 N. E. 66 (1919), Okla., Traberv.
House, 112 Okla. 273, 240 Pac. 729 (1925), Mont., Clawson v. Schroder,
63 Mont. 488, 208 Pac. 924 (1922), Penn., Kunkle v. Thompson, 67 Pa.
Super. Ct. 37; Utah, McFarlane v. Winters, 47 Utah 598, 155 Pac. 437
(1916), N. Y., Powers v. Wilson, 196 N. Y. Supp. 600;N. J., Doran v.
Thomson, 76 N. J. 754, 71 Atl. 296 (1908), Va., Cohen v. Meador, 119
Va. 429, 89 S. E. 876 (1916).
As stated, the weight of authority is represented by the latter view,
but it is by no means overwhelming. So far as the writer has been
able to ascertain, as shown above, sixteen jurisdictions apply the
doctrine, while twenty have repudiated it. This is of course a fairly
even division; however, i. his article in the Kentucky Law Journal,
Judge Sampson states that the recent tendency of the courts is against
the "family purpose doctrine." 14 Ky. L. Jour. 201.
It is a broad general rule of torts that a father is not liable for
the torts of his child. 46 C. J. 1331. The child may be the agent of the
father, but the relationship of principal and agent cannot be inferred
from the bare family connection of parent and child. Sale v. Atkzns,
206 Ky. 224, 267 S. W 223 (1924), Smith v. Jordan, 97 N. E. 761, 211
Mass. 269 (1912), Maher v. Benedict, 108 N. Y. Supp. 228 (1908).
Further the general rule is that mere ownership of an automobile
does not render the owner liable for the negligent operation of the
machine. Tyler v. Stephen's Admr., 163 Ky. 770, 175 S. W '790 (1915),
Gardner v. Farnum, 230 Mass. 193, 119 N. E. 666 (1918), Potts v.
Pardee,220 N. Y. 431, 116 N. E. 78 (1917), Decker v. Hall, 72 Ind. App.
139, 125 N. E. 786 (1920). The principal is liable for tortious acts of the
agent committed within the course of and the scope of the master's
business, the principle of respondent superior applying with full force.
Can it be saad that a child driving the family car on an independent
mission of his own, is acting within the scope of the owner's business?
That is exactly what the "family purpose doctrine" holds. No doubt
the courts in adopting the doctrine felt that here was a situation that
sadly needed a remedy. They did not want an innocent public to bear
the burden of a car being placed in the hands of a financially irresponsible child by a responsible parent-hence the doctrine pinning liability on the parent.
As the doctrine is based on the relation of principal and agent, it
has no application where a child surreptitiously obtains the family
automobile and drives it without the consent of the owner. Sale v.
Atkins, 206 Ky. 224, 267 S. W. 223 (1924), Weiner v. Mars, 234 Mass.
156, 125 N. E. 149 (1919), Reynolds v. Buck, 127 Iowa ,601, 103 N. W
946 (1905). An indispensable requisite of the "family purpose doctrine"
is that the person upon whom it is sought to pin liability, owns, maintains and, provides the automobile for the general use or convenience
of the family. Buster v. Vogel, 227 Ky. 735, 13 S. W (2d) 1028 (1929).
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Where a father provided an automobile for his minor son to drive to
school, it was held that he furnished the automobile for the customary
,convenience of the family and was liable for its negligent operation.
Stevens v. Luther, 105 Neb. 184, 180 N. W '87 (1920). No plausible
distinction can be made between the members of the family to whom
the doctrine should apply. Apparently the rule is the same, where the
"family purpose doctrine" is applied, regardless of whether the driver
is a minor child or wife ot the owntr. The husband was held liable
for the negligence of his wife in the operation of an automobile, which
he furnished for the comfort and pleasure of the family, and which
he permitted her to use for that purpose. Pasch v. Fass, 144 Minn. 44,
174 N. W 438 (1919); Collinson v. Cutter, 186 Iowa 276, 170 N. W
421 (1919), Hutchsns v. Haffner, 63 Colo. 365, 167 Pac. 966 (1917).
Of course if a mother maintains an automobile for the general use
of the family, the "family purpose doctrine" is applicable to her.
Steele v. Age's Admr., 223 Ky. 714, 26 S. W (2d) 563 (1930). In
Kennedy v. Wolf, 221 Ky. 111, 298 S, W 188 (1927), a wife owned a
machine and her husband negligently caused an injury to a third
person, while driving on a business errand of his own. The court indicated that the wife would be liable if the husband had been using
the automobile for the purpose for which it was maintained by her.
Another variation arises where a self-supporting -son, over twenty-one,
resided with his father and used the family car for his own purposes.
He is, strictly speaking, not a member of the family and where he
negligently operated the car the "family purpose doctrine" was held
not applicable. Malcolm v. Nunn, 226 Ky. 275, 10 S. W (2d) 817 (1928),
Bradley v. Schmidt, 223 Ky. 784, 4 S. W (2d) 703 (1928).
It seems that Steele v. Age's Admr., 223 Ky. 714, 26 S. W. (2d) 563
(1930), causes a just result to be reached, but really has no sound
legal basis. The doctrine applied places responsibility where it should
be. The owner has control of the machine. It is he who directs the
-use of it, and he should be accountable. Convenience and sound public
policy justify the application of the doctrine. On the other hand, as
stated above, its basis is not legally sound. Early attempts to base
it on the ground that an automobile is a dangerous instrumentality
fail in view of the well settled doctrine that an automobile is not
dangerous per -e. Tyler v. Stephen's Admx., 163 'Ky. 770, 175 S. W
790 (1915); Mullen v. Haynes Co., 207 Ky. 31 1925).
The doctrine surely is misplaced in the law of agency. It seems
far-fetched to say that a child, driving an automobile for his own
pleasure and on an expedition of his own, is engaged m the execution
of his father's business, s. e., furnishing pleasure and comfort for his
family.
The law in regard to automobiles is comparatively new, and it will
be interesting to note the reaction of the courts to the "family purpose
doctrine" in the future.
3. R. RicrARDSou.

